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Abstract 
 
This study is an empirical attempt to investigate the effects of balance sheet deterioration 
of Japanese firms and banks during the 1990s on credit allocation using the Short-term 
Economic Survey of Enterprises. This survey includes a unique item: the proportion of 
firms perceiving the lending attitude to be severe. After developing a theoretical model to 
link this item with the balance sheet conditions of borrowers and lenders, we estimated 
the relationships that we derived from our model. We found that credit was reduced when 
the balance sheet of firms and banks deteriorated. The effects are particularly significant 
for non-manufacturing industries.       
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1. Introduction 
     It is often argued that credit misallocation was responsible for the long stagnation of 
the Japanese economy during the 1990s. The case is set out as follows. Banks had 
concentrated their managerial resources around the disposal of massive, non-performing 
loans, which had prevented banks from playing the intermediary role of allocating funds 
more efficiently. Thus, the malfunction of the credit allocation system plunged the 
Japanese economy into a severe, decade-long stagnation. While few would refute this 
interpretation, a wide spectrum of opinion remains about the manner in which credit was 
misallocated in the economy.  
One view is focused on what has been termed a “credit crunch” in the 1990s. The banks, 
burdened with bad loans, reduced the amount of bank loans granted to firms. 
Bank-dependent firms were forced to cut spending on fixed investments, which lowered 
aggregated production.  
Another view is that associated with the “evergreening” of loans. It is profitable for a 
bank to continue, or even to increase, lending to insolvent firms if the bank has already 
spent a large sum of money on screening and monitoring loans to these firms, given that 
past expenses have already been sunk into this firm. Furthermore, additional loans to 
insolvent firms can delay the realization of loan losses. In other words, it is perfectly 
rational for a bank to continue to grant loans to inefficient firms in order to prevent the 
realization of loan losses. This is a well-known soft budget problem.1  From a theoretical 
perspective, it is difficult to settle the dispute over which interpretation of events is more 
plausible. Therefore, it is an issue that must be settled empirically.                       
     This paper is an empirical attempt to shed light on this issue based on survey data from 
the Short-term Economic Survey of Enterprises (or the Tankan survey), reported by the 
Bank of Japan. The Tankan survey is unique in the sense that it contains data concerning 
firms’ judgments on the credit conditions currently faced. The firms were asked to answer 
the following question: How do you perceive the current lending attitude of financial 
institutions? Firms were asked to choose one of the following three items: severe, not so 
severe, and accommodative. Each item reflects the credit condition the firm perceived 
itself to face. The Tankan survey reports the proportion of firms responding to each 
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choice by aggregating the responses of individual firms. 
Two benefits of the Tankan survey deserve special mention. First, it provides us with 
information on credit allocation viewed from the firms’ perspective. It enables us to 
incorporate demand as well as supply factors associated with loans in analyzing credit 
allocations. Secondly, survey results are available by industry and firm size, so that we 
can examine differences in credit allocations across industries and firm size. The main 
contribution of this study is that it relates information on credit allocations in the Tankan 
survey to factors underlying loan demand and supply. In particular, we are interested in 
the ways in which deterioration of the balance sheets of firms and banks in the 1990s 
affected the allocation of credit.  
      To preview our main findings, the deterioration of firms’ balance sheets in the 1990s 
raised the proportion of firms perceiving the lending attitude of financial institutions to be 
severe. This is most notable for non-manufacturing industries. Massive non-performing 
loans in the banking sector significantly raised the proportion of firms perceiving the 
lending attitude of financial institutions to be severe. This tendency is also notable for 
non-manufacturing industries, especially the real estate industry. Our results are 
irrespective of the choice of balance sheet variable with respect to the banks. Our 
evidence indicates that the credit crunch interpretation is more relevant than the 
evergreening interpretation in describing credit allocations at the industry level in the 
Japanese economy of the 1990s.                              
      The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews studies dealing with credit 
allocation and its association with the balance sheet conditions of Japanese firms and 
banks after the 1990s. We summarize previous findings on this issue. Section 3 sets up a 
simple theoretical model to analyze the relationship of credit allocations deduced from 
the Tankan survey with the factors underlying loan demand and supply. Section 4 derives 
equations that link the extent to which firms perceive the lending attitude of financial 
institutions to be severe with some underlying factors, including balance sheet variables 
of firms and banks. The data set we use is also explained in this section. Section 5 shows 
the results of our estimations and explains the implications of the manner in which credit 
was allocated in the 1990s at the industry level. Section 6 presents our conclusions.  
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2. Credit Allocation and Balance Sheet Conditions of Firms and Banks: Literature Survey 
     Here, we review empirical studies dealing with the effects of balance sheet conditions 
in Japanese firms and banks with respect to credit allocations after the 1990s. The 
empirical studies are divided into two positions. One position supports the idea that the 
deterioration of balance sheets in firms and banks had negative effects on credit allocation. 
These studies are numerous, including Yoshikawa et al. (1994), Miyagawa et al. (1995), 
Economic and Social Research Institute (1995), Maeda (1996), Peek and Rosengren 
(1997, 2000), Woo (1998), Ito and Sasaki (2002), Horie (2001), Honda (2002), Hosono 
(2006), Ohkusa (2002), and Ogawa (2003).  
There are several characteristics common to these studies. First, almost all of the studies 
investigated the effects of banks’ capital adequacy ratio and ratio of non-performing 
loans to total loans on credit allocation. Many of the studies obtained significantly 
positive effects with respect to the capital adequacy ratio and significantly negative 
effects with the non-performing loans ratio in relation to bank loans. In other words, the 
credit crunch hypothesis is supported by these studies. It is true that, in these studies, the 
factors affecting demand for bank loans were partially controlled for; however, they only 
estimate the supply schedule of bank loans. One exception is Ohkusa’s study (2002), in 
which the level and growth rate of firms’ profits are shown to be important factors that 
influence the lending attitude of financial institutions. Given that it is not an easy task to 
thoroughly identify demand and supply with respect to bank loans, it would be preferable 
to include not only factors affecting bank loan supply but also those affecting demand for 
bank loans.  
Second, most of these studies examine total bank loans, with the exception of Miyagawa 
et al. (1995), Maeda (1996) and Ogawa (2003). They divide loans into several 
components and pay special attention to the relationships between banks’ balance sheet 
conditions and bank loans to small firms. Ogawa’s study (2003) revealed evidence 
suggesting that the effect of the non-performing loans ratio is particularly strong for loans 
to small firms. Moreover, Ogawa also examined the effect of the non-performing loans 
ratio on bank loans by industry and reported that the effect of the non-performing loans 
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ratio on bank loans is larger for non-manufacturing industries.               
     The other position supports the explanation of the evergreening of loans. The studies 
providing evidence for this condition are relatively new. For example, Hoshi’s study 
(2000) offers the seminal argument that evergreening of loans is apparent in the real 
estate industry. Studies by Fukao (2000) and Sakuragawa (2002) are in the same vein. 
The former shows that the average borrowings per firm increased for the real estate 
industry in the late 1990s, and the latter reports that the correlation between the rate of 
change in land price and lending to the real estate industry vanished in the late 1990s. 
More formal empirical works estimate the supply equation of bank loans. The balance 
sheet variables commonly used in these studies are the ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans, banks’ capital adequacy ratio, and firms’ debt-asset ratio. Sasaki (2000) found 
that banks with a higher non-performing loans ratio tend to increase loans to the 
construction industry while Sugihara and Fueta (2002) also found that non-performing 
loans to the real estate industry exert a significantly positive effect on loans granted to this 
industry. Tsuru (2001) found that the capital adequacy ratio had significantly negative 
effects on loans made to the real estate industry. Hosono and Sakuragawa (2003) argued 
that banks with a lower capital adequacy ratio tend to increase real estate loans. The 
studies of Hibara (2001), Koyabashi et al. (2002), and Peek and Rosengren (2005) are 
unique in that they used matched samples of individual firms and bank lenders’ 
transactions. By examining the relationship between the non-performing loans ratio and 
the debt-asset ratio, Hibara (2001) found that banks with higher non-performing loans 
ratios tended to use less restraint in making loans to firms with high debt-asset ratios. 
Koyabashi et al. (2002) showed that beyond a certain point of debt-asset ratio, a rise in the 
debt-asset ratio corresponded with an increase in lending to firms in the construction and 
real estate industries. Peek and Rosengren (2005) offer the most comprehensive micro 
study. They demonstrated that Japanese banks increased loans to less profitable firms in 
the 1990s. Moreover, they found that this was especially so for banks with balance sheet 
deterioration and loans to affiliated firms.  
To summarize, first, the evergreening phenomena is not prevalent across industries but 
can be observed in certain, non-manufacturing industries (construction and real estate) 
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that are burdened with excessive debt. Second, all of the studies that incorporate firms’ 
balance sheet variables rely on micro data from banks and firms. Since listed firms’ 
information constitutes the micro data, the evidence supporting the evergreening 
argument is confined to large firms, with no information concerning small or 
medium-sized firms included.2  It is worth noting that small or medium-sized firms are 
more dependent on bank loans, so investigation into how credit allocation is influenced 
by the balance sheet conditions of firms, as well as that of banks, is important. The benefit 
of examining micro data from firms and banks in the context of this study is that it enables 
us to make clear estimates of the effects of balance sheet conditions of firms and banks on 
credit allocation. However, we fail to obtain macro or industry level implications for 
credit allocations from micro level evidence. It is true that credit is constrained for some 
firms with heavy debts and is expanded for some firms with excessive debts, but micro 
level evidence is silent as to the aggregated consequences of credit allocations on the 
industry level. In the subsequent sections, we investigate how credit is allocated for small 
and medium-sized firms as well as large firms. The Tankan survey is an ideal data source 
that provides us with the information necessary for conducting empirical analysis along 
these lines.        
  
3. Credit Allocation and Balance Sheet Conditions of Firms and Banks: Theoretical 
Framework 
    We set up a simple theoretical model to analyze how credit allocation across firms 
within an industry is associated with the balance sheet conditions of firms constituting an 
industry and banks. We assume that the i-th firm in a certain industry has the following 
demand schedule for bank loans:  
 
            ( )ntititidit yyyfL ,2,1, ,,, L=                       (1)  
               where ditL : demand for bank loans of the i-th firm in time t 
                     ktiy , : determinants of loan demand of the i-th firm in time t  ( )nk ,,2,1 L=  
 
Denote the supply schedule of loans to the i-th firm by sitL . 
3  The supply schedule of loans 
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is given by: 
 
           ( )ptttntititisit zzzyyygL ,,,,,, 2,1,2,1, LL=             (2) 
               where ktz :determinants of loan supply in time t  ( )pk ,,2,1 L=  
 
It should be noted that the loan schedule is influenced not only by the factors associated 
with banks, such as the banks’ balance sheet, but also by the factors that affect loan 
demand. This is because a loan contract is intrinsically determined by negotiation 
between creditors and debtors, and information concerning debtors is processed by banks 
in determining the supply of loans to the firm.4  
When the demand schedule for loans exceeds the supply schedule, the firm may perceive 
the current lending attitude of financial institution to be severe. Let itθ  be the extent to 
which the supply schedule exceeds demand schedule, or:  
 
          1−= d
it
s
it
it L
Lθ                                 (3)  
            
Then, itθ  can capture the extent to which the firm perceives the present lending attitude to 
be severe. The Tankan survey we used for data in our empirical analysis reports the 
percentage share of firms regarding the current lending attitude as severe, not so severe 
and accommodative, respectively. These ratios were easily translated into our framework. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of itθ  across firms within a certain industry. We denote 
the percentage share of firms feeling the present lending attitude to be severe, not so 
severe, and accommodative as ttt ANSS , , respectively. Then, we have:  
 
           ( )∫−∞−= 1δ θθ ititt dfS  
           ( )∫+−= 21δδ θθ ititt dfNS                     (4)  
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           ( )∫+∞+= 2δ θθ ititt dfA  
            where 1δ : threshold to recognize the lending attitude as severe  
                  2δ : threshold to recognize the lending attitude as accommodative 
 
By specifying the density function, we can obtain more tractable expressions for eq.(4). 
We assume that the distribution function of itθ  is given by the following logistic 
function: 
 
        ( ) βαθθ /)(1
1
−−+= iteF it                       (5) 
                  where βα , :shift parameters  0>β   
 
Since itθ  is defined as the ratio of supply to demand for loans, it is a function of the 
factors affecting both supply and demand for loans. In other words, the shape of the 
distribution hinges upon pttttntitititi zzzzyyyy ,,,,,,,, 321,,3,2,,1, LL ( )Ii ,,2,1 L= , where I 
is the number of firms. These variables are the driving force of the shift parameters. Since 
it is impossible to incorporate the information of individual firms into our analysis, we 
assume that the shift parameter α  is a function of the mean of firm attributes. We denote 
the mean of ntitititi yyyy ,3,2,1, ,,,, L  across firms by nttt yyy ,,, 21 L . 5   Then, α  is 
expressed as follows:  
 
            ( )pttntt zzyyh ,,,,, 11 LL=α               (6)  
 
From this, we can link the proportion of firms perceiving the present lending attitude to be 
severe ( )tS  with the factors underlying supply and demand for loans.  
 
             ( ) βδ /),,,,,( 1111
1
pttntt zzyyht e
S LL−−−+=              (7)  
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In our framework, the effects of factors affecting loan demand and supply on tS  may be 
easily analyzed. For example, the effect of deterioration of a bank’s balance sheet on tS  
can be examined in the following manner. Suppose that deterioration of the bank’s 
balance sheet makes the bank more reluctant to supply loans to firms. It will lower itθ  for 
some firms, and the distribution function of itθ  will shift to the left, as shown in Figure 2. 
Thus, the proportion of firms perceiving the lending attitude to be severe rises.  
However, the bank might increase loans as a result of soft budget problems when the 
bank’s balance sheet deteriorates. Then, it will raise itθ  for some firms, and the 
distribution function of itθ  will correspondingly shift to the right. This implies that the 
proportion of firms perceiving the lending attitude to be severe falls. This case is that of 
the evergreening of loans. In actuality, some firms might observe a rise of itθ  while 
others might observe a fall of itθ . Therefore, the question of whether the proportion of 
firms perceiving the lending attitude to be severe increases or not is purely an empirical 
issue.  
In a similar fashion, we can analyze the effects of factors affecting loan demand on tS . 
Suppose that the outlook for the firm’s profitability becomes gloomy. Then, the firm will 
decrease demand for loans. This will raise itθ  and the percentage share of firms 
perceiving the lending attitude to be severe will fall. However, when the bank finds out 
the firm’s gloomy profit expectations, a decrease of loan demand might be 
accommodated. This might lead to a fall of itθ  and the proportion of firms feeling the 
lending attitude to be severe might rise. This illustrates the importance of firms’ 
information to the banks’ loan supply decisions; it also shows that the question of whether 
banks accommodate a change in loan demand hinges upon firms’ information as well as 
on the ways in which banks process such information. This is an empirical issue to be 
investigated in subsequent sections.  
It should be noted that we can also link the proportion of firms perceiving the present 
lending attitude to be accommodative ( tA ) to the factors underlying the demand and 
supply schedule of loans. It is written as: 
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( ) ( ) βδβδ /),,,,,(/),,,,,( 112112 1
1
1
11
pttnttpttntt zzyyhzzyyht ee
A LLLL −−− +=+−=        (8)  
 
This equation is estimated jointly with eq.(7).  
                     
4. Framework of Empirical Investigation and Data Set  
     In the previous section, we derived the basic equation to link the proportion of firms 
perceiving the lending attitude to be severe or accommodative with the factors underlying 
loan demand and supply. The purpose of this section is twofold. One is to modify the 
basic equations and derive the equation to estimate the effects of the factors underlying 
supply and demand for loans on credit allocation. The other is to explain the data set we 
used in the estimation as well as the procedures for constructing the variables.  
 
A. Specification of Lending Attitude Equation       
      In estimating eqs.(7) and (8), the shift parameter of α  is specified as a linear function 
of the factors underlying loan demand and supply. We selected the following variables 
that affect loan demand. They are liquidity measure (LIQ), growth potential (GROWTH), 
and balance sheet condition of firms (FBALANCE). As for the variables that affect loan 
supply, we chose the balance sheet variable of banks (BBALANCE). 
     Specifically, the equation linking the proportion of firms perceiving the lending 
attitude of financial institutions to be severe ( tS ) with the factors underlying loan demand 
and supply is written as:                
 
te
St Φ+= 1
1                    (9)  
          where 
             
ttt
tttt
BBALANCEFBALANCEBBALANCE
FBALANCELIQGROWTH
×++
++++=Φ
65
4321
γγ
γγγγ
 
               β
δγ 11 =  
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     An increase of firms’ liquidity may decrease the demand for loans and lead to a fall in 
tS  by way of a rise in itθ . Thus, the coefficient 3γ  is positive. Higher growth potential 
will increase the demand for loans. It will lower itθ and tS  will rise as long as banks do 
not accommodate the increase of loan demand. On the other hand, when banks 
accommodate an increase in loan demand, it might be the case that itθ  rises and tS  falls. 
Therefore the sign of 2γ  is indeterminate a priori.    
Deterioration of firms’ balance sheets, leading to the reduction of demand for loans, may 
also reduce loan supply if banks are aware of firms’ balance sheet deteriorations. When 
the reduction of loan supply by banks is larger than that of loan demand, itθ  will fall and 
tS  will rise. In this case, the coefficient 4γ  is negative. However, if the firms increase 
their demands for loans in spite of the deterioration of their balance sheets, to repay debt, 
for example, and banks support this decision by increasing loan supply, it may raise itθ  
and tS  will fall ( )04 >γ . This case can be interpreted as an example of the evergreening 
of loans. 
Deterioration of banks’ balance sheets generally reduces loan supply, which lowers itθ  
and raises tS . In other words, the coefficient 5γ  is negative. However, when the banks 
boost loan supply, in spite of the deterioration of their balance sheets, it lowers tS  
( 05 >γ ). This also corresponds to the case of evergreening of loans. To sum up, we can 
determine whether evergreening of loans is prevalent by examining the sign of the 
coefficients of FBALANCE and/or BBALANCE.   
We added the cross term of the firms’ balance sheet conditions with that of the banks’ to 
measure the interaction between the balance sheets of the two sectors. The cross term 
plays an important role in strengthening or weakening the individual balance sheet effects. 
When 6γ  is negative, it will enhance the effects of credit crunch, whereas when 6γ  is 
positive it will enhance the effects of evergreening. 
Lastly, we take account of the differential effects of balance sheet conditions of firms and 
banks on credit allocation by industry and firm size. As we pointed out in Section 2, the 
evergreening phenomenon has been found mainly in non-manufacturing industries 
burdened with excessive and outstanding debt. Moreover, small firms are more 
bank-dependent, so the bank relationship might be special to small firm clients. This 
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suggests that evaluation of firms’ balance sheet conditions by banks might have a 
differential impact on banks’ lending attitudes toward small firms. To take these 
possibilities into consideration, we add the cross term of balance sheet variables of firms 
and banks, with dummy variables for industry and firm size, to eq.(9).6  That is, we have: 
   
te
St Φ+= 1
1                    (10)  
    where            
ttkt
q
k
IktMtS
tkt
q
k
IktMtS
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IktMtS
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                          where tDUMS : dummy variable for small firms 
tDUMM : dummy variable for medium-sized firms 
ktDUMIND :dummy variable for the k-th industry ),,2,1( qk L=  
 
It should also be noted that all the explanatory variables except growth potential are in 
first difference form.7, 8 
In a similar fashion, we can write the proportion of firms perceiving the present lending 
attitude to be accommodative ( tA ) as a function of factors underlying supply and demand 
for bank loans as follows: 
 
te
St Ψ+= 1
1           (11)  
   where  
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Note that the coefficient of each explanatory variable in eq.(11) has the reverse sign of 
eq.(10).  
 
B. Data Set Description and Construction of Variables 
The Tankan survey reports, on a quarterly basis, the proportion of firms perceiving the 
lending attitude of financial institutions to be severe by industry and firm size. Sample 
firms are private firms selected from the population of all firms in Japan employing 50 or 
more persons (or 20 or more persons for wholesale, retail, and leasing industries). The 
Tankan survey classifies industries into 17 manufacturing and 10 non-manufacturing 
industries. We chose 14 manufacturing and six non-manufacturing industries with 
available balance sheet information.9  Sample firms are classified by size into large, 
medium, and small firm groups based on the number of employees. Large firms are 
defined as those with a number of employees over 1,000. Medium-sized firms are defined 
as those with a number of employees between 300 and 1,000. Small firms are defined as 
those with a number of employees below 300.10 Our sample period covers the second 
quarter of 1983 to the first quarter of 2003. In our data, we pooled all of our observations 
across industry and firm size, so that observations total 4,800 (= 32080 ×× ). 
The explanatory variables of loan demand are taken from the Financial Statements 
Statistics of Corporations by Industry (abbreviated as FSSC), issued by the Ministry of 
Finance. A variety of items on firms’ balance sheets as well as profit and loss accounts are 
reported on a quarterly basis by industry and firm size. One difficulty of matching the 
Tankan survey with the FSSC lies in the difference of size classification. The former 
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classifies by the number of employees, while the latter classifies by equity capital. We 
assume that the firms whose equity capital exceeds one billion yen correspond to large 
firms in the Tankan survey. Similarly, the firms whose equity capital is between 0.1 and 1 
billion yen correspond to medium-sized firms in the Tankan survey, and the firms whose 
equity capital is below 0.1 billion yen correspond to small firms in the Tankan survey. 
Although the two definitions of firm size are different, it turns out that they are closely 
related. In the FSSC, the average number of employees in the fiscal year of 2003 is 16.3, 
167.6, and 1192.1 for small, medium-sized, and large firm groups, respectively, across all 
industries.     
Liquidity is measured by the ratio of cash, deposit, and securities balance plus ordinary 
income and depreciation allowance, to sales. Growth potential (GROWTH) is measured 
by the growth rate of real sales. The balance sheet variable of the firm (FBALANCE) is 
measured by the ratio of short-term and long-term borrowings to market-valued land 
stock. Land stock is constructed by the perpetual inventory method.11  Since land is the 
most popular form of collateral in Japan, this ratio reflects the extent to which actual 
borrowings exceed firms’ borrowing capacities or the degree of excess borrowings. The 
balance sheet variable of the bank (BBALANCE) is the ratio of allowance for doubtful 
loans to total loans. This variable is a proxy for the ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans and is the only one available on a quarterly basis. The balance sheet variables we 
use are dated at the beginning of the period to avoid simultaneity bias. The variables of 
firm attributes are on a per firm basis and all of the variables are seasonally adjusted. 12       
Table 1 shows the sample mean of the ratio of borrowing outstanding to market-valued 
land stock. The ratio is higher for non-manufacturing industries. It hovers at around unity 
for small firms, except for the service industry. The ratio tends to be highest for large 
firms, except for those in retail and the real estate industries. For manufacturing industries, 
there is less regularity on the magnitude of the ratios across industry and firm size. Table 
2 shows the average growth rate of real sales. Negative sales growth was dominant in 
most of the industries, reflecting severe stagnation in the 1990s. In particular, the growth 
rate of real sales was negative, irrespective of firm size, for food, steel, fabricated metals, 
construction, and retail industries. In contrast with stagnant industries, there were 
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industries that exhibited positive growth rate, irrespective of firm size. These were 
chemicals, electrical machinery, transportation machinery, and transportation and 
information communication industries.                       
 
5. Estimation Results and Their Implications for Credit Allocation 
A. Estimation Results of Lending Attitude Equation  
      Here, we turn to our estimation results that indicate some important implications for 
credit allocation. Eqs.(10) and (11) are jointly estimated by nonlinear least squares. 
Estimation results are shown in Table 3.13  As we expected, the coefficient estimate of 
liquidity is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Increase of firms’ 
liquidity reduces demand for loans and hence decreases the proportion of firms 
perceiving the lending attitude to be severe. There was no discernible difference in the 
effects of liquidity on the proportion of firms perceiving the lending attitude to be severe 
among small, medium-sized, and large firms. The coefficient estimate of sales growth 
rate is significantly positive. It implies that higher growth potentials decrease the 
proportion of firms perceiving the lending attitude to be severe by inducing banks to 
accommodate firms’ increased loan demand.                 
 
B. Implications for Credit Allocation: Credit Crunch or Evergreening?  
     Based on the coefficient estimates of the balance sheet variables of firms and banks, 
we can infer how changes in the balance sheet conditions of firms and banks affect credit 
allocation. If deterioration of balance sheet conditions tightens credit allocations, then we 
observe a credit crunch. On the other hand, if a deterioration of balance sheet conditions 
loosens credit allocations, then we observe evergreening. Our estimation results have the 
advantage that we can examine the effects of balance sheet conditions on credit allocation 
by industry and firm size.  
     We conducted our investigation in three different ways. First, we examined the 
coefficient estimates of the cross term of firms’ balance sheet conditions with those of 
banks. 14  It is easily shown that the effects of change in the balance sheet conditions of 
firms and banks regarding credit allocation is calculated from eq.(10) as: 
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                                                                 (12) 
  
When the cross term coefficient, the last term of the R.H.S. of eq.(12), is positive, 
deterioration of the balance sheet of one sector will mitigate the tightening effect of the  
balance sheet deterioration of the other sector on credit allocation. Thus, it is interpreted 
as evergreening. Table 4 shows the coefficient estimates of the cross term by industry and 
firm size. The significant cross terms are all negative for large firms. There is only one 
significantly positive cross term (petroleum and coal products industry) for 
medium-sized firms. For small firms, there is also one industry (industrial machinery 
industry) that has a significantly positive cross term. Judging from the cross term 
coefficients of firms’ balance sheets and banks’ balance sheets, evergreening does not 
seem to be prevalent in the economy.   
     The second way to examine these effects of balance sheet conditions of firms and 
banks on credit allocation is to calculate directly the effects of changes in the balance 
sheet conditions of firms and banks on the proportion of the firms perceiving the lending 
attitude to be severe, as is shown in eq.(12). We evaluate eq.(12) by industry and firm size 
based on the sample mean of tt FBALANCES ∆,  and tBBALANCE∆  over the fourth 
quarter of 1997 to the first quarter of 2002, a period of financial turmoil. Tables 5 and 6 
show the estimates of ( )t
t
FBALANCE
S
∆∂
∂   and  ( )t
t
BBALANCE
S
∆∂
∂   calculated in this 
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manner.  
Deterioration of firms’ balance sheet conditions significantly increases the proportion of 
firms perceiving the lending attitude to be severe, across all industries, for large firms. 
This implies that credit allocation tightens as the balance sheets of large firms deteriorate. 
A similar tendency is observed, though less dramatically, for medium-sized and small 
firms. For medium-sized and small firms, we observed negative effects of firms’ balance 
sheet deteriorations on the proportion of firms perceiving the lending attitude to be severe 
for petroleum and coal products, non-ferrous metals, and service industries. It is 
significant only for small firms in the petroleum and coal products industries. In 18 out of 
20 industries, we observed significantly positive effects for medium-sized firms, while 
we observed significantly positive effects in 11 industries for small firms. It should be 
noted that the estimates are notably large for retail, construction, and fabricated metals 
industries, irrespective of firm size.  
      A rise of the non-performing loan ratio makes banks’ lending attitudes more severe 
for large and medium-sized firms across all industries, apart from the lumber and wood 
products industry. The rise of the non-performing loan ratio makes banks’ lending 
attitudes more accommodative for small firms in lumber and wood products, fabricated 
metals, industrial machinery, transportation machinery, and construction industries. 
However, the effect is significant only in the lumber and wood products industry. Credit 
contraction effects are significant in four, 11, and 10 industries out of 20 for small, 
medium-sized, and large firms, respectively. The effects are particularly significant in the 
real estate industry, in which a rise of the ratio of allowance for doubtful loans to total 
loans by a single percentage point increases the proportion of firms perceiving the lending 
attitude to be severe by 15.1, 20.4 and 19.9 percentage points for small, medium-sized, 
and large firms, respectively. In the late 1990s, evergreening was seldom observed on an 
industry level, irrespective of firm size. Rather, we observed a serious credit crunch 
situation, especially in non-manufacturing industries.     
      Lastly, we show inter-industry evidence on the effects of firms’ balance sheet 
conditions on credit allocation. This can be accomplished by calculating the correlation 
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coefficient of the ( )t
t
FBALANCE
S
∆∂
∂   and  ( )t
t
BBALANCE
S
∆∂
∂  estimates obtained above 
with the firms’ balance sheet conditions across industries. When credit crunch is 
prevalent, we will see that the effects of change in balance sheet conditions on lending 
attitude is particularly severe for industries with deteriorating balance sheets. That is, we 
will observe positive correlations between the estimates of ( )t
t
FBALANCE
S
∆∂
∂   and  
( )t
t
BBALANCE
S
∆∂
∂  with the firms’ borrowings-land ratio. On the other hand, when 
evergreening is prevalent, deterioration of balance sheets will mitigate the effects of 
change in balance sheet conditions on lending attitude. In this case we will observe 
negative correlations. The correlation coefficient between the ( )t
t
BBALANCE
S
∆∂
∂  
estimate and the firms’ balance sheet conditions, calculated by combining all the 
observations across firm size, is 0.3314, and is significant. 15  It indicates that the 
credit-tightening effect is more severe for industries with firms showing more balance 
sheet deterioration. This is evidence for a credit crunch condition, not for an evergreening 
of loans situation.    
 
C. Is Our Evidence Robust?: Estimation under Alternative Specifications   
    The estimation results obtained so far lend support for the prevalence of credit crunch 
rather than evergreening on an industry level. We examine the robustness of our evidence 
by estimating the lending attitude equation under alternative specifications. We replace 
the banks’ balance sheet variable with the rate of change in share price of the banking 
sector. The previous measure, the ratio of allowance for doubtful loans to total loan, 
shows how bad the firms’ balance sheet conditions are on the basis of accounting 
information. It is often argued that balance sheet information is not reliable because of 
“window dressing.” In this case, a market-based measure of balance sheet conditions is 
more relevant. It would be legitimate to assume that share prices in the banking sector 
reflect the evaluation of bank health by the market. It turns out that the coefficient 
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estimates of liquidity and growth rate of sales under these new specifications are quite 
similar to those of the previous case. Thus, our focus here is on how the balance sheet 
conditions of firms and banks affect credit allocation. This is investigated in three 
different ways, as in the previous case. Table 7 shows the cross term of the firms’ balance 
sheet with the rate of change in share price of the banking sector. Since a rise in the rate of 
change in banks’ share prices reflects the improvement of banks’ balance sheets, a 
negative cross term corresponds to the evergreening case. It is only in the real estate 
industry that we observe evergreening, irrespective of firm size.16 Our evidence for 
evergreening in the real estate industry lends empirical support to previous studies. 
However, it should be noted that the prevalence of evergreening, judging from the sign of 
the cross term, is weak, given that even if the cross term is negative, the total effects of 
balance sheet deterioration on credit allocation calculated by eq.(12) could also support 
the credit crunch hypothesis. In fact, the deterioration of balance sheet conditions on the 
part of banks and firms leads to a more severe lending attitude for the real estate industry, 
irrespective of firm size, as will be seen below. 
        Here, we examine the ( )t
t
FBALANCE
S
∆∂
∂   and  ( )t
t
BBALANCE
S
∆∂
∂  estimates, shown 
in Tables 8 and 9. Deterioration of firms’ balance sheets significantly increases the 
proportion of firms perceiving the lending attitude to be severe for large firms across all 
industries. For medium-sized and small firms, we obtained negative estimates of  
( )t
t
FBALANCE
S
∆∂
∂   in petroleum and coal products, precision machinery, and service 
industries. All of the significant estimates are positive except for the petroleum and coal 
products industry, indicating the prevalence of credit crunch. As for the effects of banks’ 
share price change on the credit allocation, a drop in the rate of change in banks’ share 
prices increases the proportion of firms perceiving the lending attitude to be severe across 
all industries, except for the lumber and wood products industry, irrespective of firm size. 
In particular, the estimates are significantly negative and large in absolute value for the 
real estate industry, irrespective of firm size. 
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     Lastly, we calculate the correlation coefficients of the ( )t
t
FBALANCE
S
∆∂
∂   and  
( )t
t
BBALANCE
S
∆∂
∂  estimates with the firms’ balance sheet conditions across industries. 
The correlation coefficient between the ( )t
t
BBALANCE
S
∆∂
∂  estimates and the firms’ 
borrowings-land ratio, calculated by combining all the observations across firm size, is 
-0.2938, and is statistically significant at the 5% level.17 Once again, the credit crunch 
hypothesis is supported by inter-industry comparison.        
To sum up our evidence, balance sheet deterioration of firms and banks in the late 1990s 
reduced credit ubiquitously across industries. It should be noted that our evidence is not 
inconsistent with past studies that have argued for the evergreening case. This is because 
most of the studies that have obtained evidence favorable to evergreening have been 
conducted using micro data from firms. Our study uses more aggregated industry level 
data. As we pointed out in Section 3, it is true that deterioration of balance sheets has 
adverse effects on credit allocation to some firms, while other firms will perceive that the 
lending attitude gets more severe. Our examination of the proportion of firms perceiving 
the lending attitude to be severe, using evidence at the industry level, simply 
demonstrates that the number of firms suffering from the credit crunch condition is 
greater than those benefiting from evergreening.            
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
      Empirical data on how balance sheet deterioration of firms and banks affected credit 
allocation in the 1990s revealed that credit allocation was reduced as a whole. The extent 
to which each industry suffered from credit reduction depends on the attributes of 
individual industries as well as the banking sector. The effects were notably large for the 
non-manufacturing sector, although the effects are not uniform across industries in the 
manufacturing sector. There remains another, more important, task to be completed: an 
investigation into how credit allocation in the 1990s affected the resource allocation of 
the economy. This is a promising avenue for future work, one that could lead to a deeper 
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understanding of the economic mechanisms of the last decade. 18 
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Footnotes 
 
1 See Dewartripont and Maskin (1995) and Berglof and Rӧland (1995,1997) for detailed 
discussions of the soft budget problem. 
2 An exception is the study by Fukuda et al. (2005) in which the reduced form of the loan 
equation is estimated using a matched sample of unlisted firms and banks. The results are 
mixed. Deterioration of firm health leads to reduction of bank loans, while deterioration 
of bank health increases bank loans.  
3 For simplicity, we assume that there is one representative bank that provides loans to all 
of the firms in the economy.   
4 Interest payment is also an endogenous variable determined as a part of loan contract, so 
that interest rate does not appear as an explanatory variable in the loan demand and 
supply schedule.  
5 The variables ptt zz ,,1 L  are associated with the representative bank, so that they can be 
interpreted as the mean of the attributes of total banks.  
6 The effect of liquidity on demand for bank loans might vary across firms of different 
sizes, so that we add the cross term of liquidity with dummy variables for firm size.  
7 We also add dummy variables of firm size and industry to the constant term of tΦ . 
8 As will be explained below, growth potential is measured by the growth rate of real 
sales. Therefore, we do not take first difference of it. 
9 These are textiles, lumber and wood products, paper and pulp, chemicals, petroleum and 
coal products, ceramics, stone and clay products, steel, non-ferrous metals, food, 
fabricated metals, industrial machinery, electrical machinery, transportation machinery 
and precision machinery for manufacturing industries and construction, real estate, 
wholesale, retail, transportation and information communication, and service for 
non-manufacturing industries.   
10 For the wholesale industry, medium-sized firms are defined as those with employees 
between 100 and 1,000, while small firms are defined as those with employees between 
20 and 100. For retail, service, and lease industries, medium-sized firms are defined as 
those with employees between 50 and 1,000, while small firms are defined as those with 
employees between 20 and 50. 
11 See Ogawa(2000) for detailed procedures for constructing market-valued land stock.  
12 For the judgment questions in the Tankan survey, the respondents are asked to answer 
on the lending attitude of financial institutions excluding seasonal factors. That is the 
reason why we do not seasonally adjust the proportion of firms perceiving the lending 
attitude to be severe.  
13 Constant terms including dummies for industry and firm size are suppressed in the 
table.  
14 Hibara (2001) takes a similar approach to test the prevalence of evergreening of loans.      
15 The correlation coefficient between the ( )t
t
FBALANCE
S
∆∂
∂  estimates and the firms’ 
borrowings-land ratio calculated by combining all the observations across firm size is 
0.0735 and insignificant.  
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16 A statistically negative coefficient of the cross term is also obtained in petroleum and 
coal products, precision machinery, and service industries for medium-sized firms. 
17 The correlation coefficient between the ( )t
t
FBALANCE
S
∆∂
∂  estimates and the firms’ 
borrowings-land ratio, calculated by combining all the observations across firm size, is 
0.0234 and insignificant. 
18 Nishimura et al. (2005) and Caballero et al. (2004) are interesting attempts along this 
line.  
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　　　　　　　　　　 Table 1  Descriptive Statistics:
Ratio of Borrowing Outstandings to Market-Valued Land Stock 
　　　　　　　　　　 Small Medium-Sized Large
 firms firms firms 
Manufacturing industries
Food 1.18 0.77 0.51
Textiles 0.72 1.23 1.07
Lumber and wood products 0.70 0.97 0.57
Paper and pulp 0.82 0.91 1.39
Chemicals 0.68 0.80 0.79
Petroleum and coal products 0.68 2.28 1.29
Ceramics, stone and clay products 0.99 0.91 0.83
Steel 0.51 0.86 1.21
Non-ferrous metals 0.94 1.71 1.71
Fabricated metals 0.90 0.76 0.80
Industrial machinery 1.11 1.13 0.66
Electrical machinery 0.94 1.31 0.85
Transportation machinery 0.70 0.81 0.32
Precision machinery 0.92 0.72 0.80
Average 0.84 1.08 0.91
Non-manufacturing industries
Construction 0.98 1.33 1.60
Wholesale 0.96 1.31 2.67
Retail 0.95 0.95 0.50
Real estate 1.00 1.15 1.11
Service 0.72 1.59 3.15
Transportation and information
commucication 1.00 0.84 1.09
Average 0.93 1.19 1.69
Data Source: The Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry
　　　　　　　　　　 Table 2  Descriptive Statistics:
Growth Rate of Real Sales 
(%; per annum)
　　　　　　　　　　 Small Medium-Sized Large
 firms firms firms 
Manufacturing industries
Food -1.34 -1.54 -0.67
Textiles -3.73 4.09 -1.52
Lumber and wood products -0.06 2.49 -1.68
Paper and pulp -0.94 0.64 -0.09
Chemicals 1.91 0.55 0.65
Petroleum and coal products -0.82 6.30 2.11
Ceramics, stone and clay produc -0.18 0.08 -0.44
Steel -1.06 -0.36 -0.53
Non-ferrous metals -2.13 0.85 -0.43
Fabricated metals -2.24 -1.54 -1.19
Industrial machinery 0.18 0.01 -0.09
Electrical machinery 2.88 5.65 3.28
Transportation machinery 3.74 0.48 0.07
Precision machinery 2.18 -0.39 1.87
Average -0.11 1.24 0.10
Non-manufacturing industries
Construction -4.61 -1.10 -2.24
Wholesale -2.36 0.28 -3.93
Retail -1.46 -0.35 -1.69
Real estate 0.76 -1.11 0.85
Service -2.24 -1.75 0.17
Transportation and information
commucication 0.15 1.37 4.33
Average -1.63 -0.44 -0.42
Data Source: The Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry
Table 3 
      Estimation Results of Basic Lending Attitude Equation
Variables ParameterEstimates t-value
GROWTH 1.045 *** 8.98
Terms associated
with ∆LIQ   
Constant 1.0404 *** 4.04
DUMS -0.3981 -1.34
DUMM -0.3171 -1.01
Terms associated
with ∆FBALANCE
Constant -3.0099 *** -6.16
DUMS 2.6054 *** 8.67
DUMM 1.7731 *** 6.42
DUMIND1 0.5879 1.23
DUMIND2 0.0382  0.06
DUMIND3 -0.5075 -0.85
DUMIND4 -0.9486 -1.60
DUMIND5 1.2219 *** 2.56
DUMIND6 -0.3953 -0.61
DUMIND7 -0.8897 -1.31
DUMIND8 0.4731 0.91
DUMIND9 -1.9022 *** -2.73
DUMIND10 -0.9097 -1.56
DUMIND11 -0.592 -0.93
DUMIND12 -0.9726 -1.34
DUMIND13 0.0761 0.13
DUMIND14 -1.6957 ** -2.35
DUMIND15 -0.1805 -0.33
DUMIND16 -0.4261  -0.66
DUMIND17 -2.6146 *** -3.12
DUMIND18 0.9063 * 1.70
DUMIND19 -0.9273 -1.53
Terms associated
with ∆BBALANCE
Constant -12.8685  -0.80
DUMS 14.0278 1.60
DUMM -6.7693 -0.80
DUMIND1 -24.4064 -1.13
DUMIND2 40.1898 * 1.93
DUMIND3 -7.843 -0.36
DUMIND4 -6.4631 -0.31
DUMIND5 -74.5895 *** -3.50
DUMIND6 -11.0429 -0.48
DUMIND7 -45.3541 ** -2.04
DUMIND8 -22.4138 -0.98
DUMIND9 1.1467 0.05
DUMIND10 -22.6438 -1.00
DUMIND11 -2.552 -0.11
DUMIND12 3.5277 0.16
DUMIND13 -5.5587 -0.25
DUMIND14 8.5448 0.39
DUMIND15 -69.9243 *** -3.59
DUMIND16 -6.1016  -0.27
DUMIND17 -11.4517 -0.51
DUMIND18 -19.1004 -0.86
DUMIND19 -31.7175 -1.39
Table 3 (Continued) 
      Estimation Results of Basic Lending Attitude Equation
Variables ParameterEstimates t-value
Terms associated
with ∆FBALANCE×
∆BBALANCE
Constant -356.8178 -1.15
DUMS 498.0376 ** 2.45
DUMM 578.465 *** 3.33
DUMIND1 -292.8372 -0.94
DUMIND2 -988.9275 *** -3.22
DUMIND3 -323.6759 -0.76
DUMIND4 194.5783 0.50
DUMIND5 86.4861 0.29
DUMIND6 251.1433 0.59
DUMIND7 -573.8991  -1.47
DUMIND8 -215.7686 -0.63
DUMIND9 -178.7633 -0.39
DUMIND10 892.1184 ** 2.06
DUMIND11 -406.2842 -0.98
DUMIND12 -263.3822  -0.47
DUMIND13 -1092.1964 *** -2.86
DUMIND14 85.4867 0.18
DUMIND15 -567.9458 -1.62
DUMIND16 -205.6978 -0.53
DUMIND17 328.4504  0.60
DUMIND18 65.6554 0.18
DUMIND19 398.8008 0.74
Notes: DUMIND1 to DUMIND19 corresponds to the following
industries: textiles, lumber and wood products, paper and pulp,
chemicals, petroleum and coal products, ceramics, stone and clay products,
steel, non-ferrous metals, fabricated metals, industrial machinery,
electrical machiney, transportation machinery, precision machinery,
construction, real estate, wholesale, retail, service and 
transportation and information communication.
*** ,**,*     significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
　　　　　　　　　　 Table 4  Coefficient Estimates of the Cross Term
of Balance Sheet Variables of Firms and Banks 
　　　　　　　　　　                  Small firms firms                      Medium-Sized firms                               Large firms 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Manufacturing industries
Food 141.2198 0.51 221.6472 0.76 -356.8178 -1.15
Textiles -151.6175 -0.75 -71.1900 -0.56 -649.6551 *** -3.17
Lumber and wood products -847.7078 *** -4.35 -767.2803 *** -7.07 -1345.7454 *** -7.05
Paper and pulp -182.4562 -0.54 -102.0287 -0.30 -680.4938 * -1.94
Chemicals 335.7981 1.13 416.2256 1.39 -162.2395 -0.49
Petroleum and coal products 227.7059 1.28 308.1333 *** 5.15 -270.3317 -1.48
Ceramics, stone and clay product 392.3630 1.18 472.7905 1.37 -105.6745 -0.29
Steel -432.6793 -1.42 -352.2518 -1.28 -930.7169 *** -2.97
Non-ferrous metals -74.5489 -0.30 5.8786 0.03 -572.5865 ** -2.32
Fabricated metals -37.5435 -0.10 42.8839 0.11 -535.5811 -1.32
Industrial machinery 1033.3382 *** 3.01 1113.7656 3.10 535.3006 1.40
Electrical machinery -265.0644 -0.84 -184.6369 -0.55 -763.1020 ** -2.15
Transportation machinery -122.1624 -0.25 -41.7349 -0.09 -620.2000 -1.22
Precision machinery -950.9767 *** -3.36 -870.5492 *** -2.91 -1449.0142 *** -4.91
Non-manufacturing industries
Construction 226.7064 0.54 307.1339 0.75 -271.3312 -0.68
Wholesale -64.4780 -0.21 15.9494 0.06 -562.5156 * -1.91
Retail 469.6701 0.98 550.0976 1.12 -28.3674 -0.06
Real estate -426.7261 * -1.73 -346.2986 -1.49 -924.7636 *** -3.44
Service 206.8751 0.76 287.3026 1.11 -291.1624 -1.13
Transportation and information
commucication 540.0206 1.14 620.4481 1.32 41.9830 0.09
*** ,**,*     significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
Table 5   Estimates of the Effects of Change in  
Firms' Balance Sheet Conditions on Lending Attitude 
　　　　　　　　　　 Small Medium-Sized Large
firms firms firms 
 Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Manufacturing industries 6.22
Food 0.0575 0.87 0.1268 *** 2.67 0.2596 *** 7.70
Textiles -0.0352 -0.53 0.1182 ** 3.30 0.4734 *** 6.69
Lumber and wood products 0.0911 1.11 0.2832 *** 3.12 0.3398 *** 7.62
Paper and pulp 0.1237 ** 2.17 0.2353 *** 4.04 0.2205 *** 8.34
Chemicals 0.1254 *** 2.97 0.1449 *** 5.08 0.3209 *** 5.75
Petroleum and coal products -0.0637 *** -3.06 -0.0069 -0.20 0.1966 *** 6.35
Ceramics, stone and clay product 0.1265 1.51 0.2344 *** 3.11 0.3772 *** 7.03
Steel 0.2586 ** 2.43 0.4294 *** 3.97 0.7709 *** 7.80
Non-ferrous metals -0.0104 -0.16 0.0875 ** 2.45 0.4398 *** 8.17
Fabricated metals 0.3527 *** 4.06 0.3870 *** 5.31 0.9402 *** 8.07
Industrial machinery 0.2072 *** 2.94 0.3296 *** 4.58 0.4990 *** 6.86
Electrical machinery 0.1771 ** 2.08 0.1820 *** 3.73 0.3904 *** 6.33
Transportation machinery 0.2436 ** 2.35 0.3224 *** 3.64 0.5143 *** 7.36
Precision machinery 0.0914 1.18 0.1490 *** 3.13 0.4068 ***
Non-manufacturing industries
Construction 0.3161 *** 3.46 0.3874 *** 4.92 0.7987 *** 7.84
Wholesale 0.1433 1.62 0.2474 *** 3.27 0.5233 *** 7.33
Retail 0.6256 *** 4.09 0.7146 *** 5.11 0.8969 *** 7.40
Real estate 0.1462 * 1.92 0.3496 *** 3.82 0.7904 *** 7.63
Service -0.1065 -1.48 0.0579 0.86 0.3051 *** 6.06
Transportation and information
commucication 0.2110 *** 2.85 0.4247 *** 4.31 0.6008 *** 7.68
*** ,**,*     significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
　　　　　　　　　　 Table 6   Estimates of the Effects of Change in 
Banks' Balance Sheet Conditions on Lending Attitude 
　　　　　　　　　　  Small  Medium-Sized  Large
 firms  firms  firms 
 Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Manufacturing industries  
Food 0.3098 0.11 2.0895  1.21 1.3360  0.99
Textiles 5.0672 1.42 7.5929 ** 2.55 6.9521 ** 2.33
Lumber and wood products -7.3758 *** -2.72 5.1341 * 1.68 -1.4056  -0.92
Paper and pulp 0.6296  0.28 3.7898 * 1.74 1.8869 * 1.88
Chemicals 0.0515  0.03 0.9548  0.81 1.6686  1.38
Petroleum and coal products 5.4113 *** 4.64 19.6540 *** 6.66 9.4143 *** 5.67
Ceramics, stone and clay product 2.6000  0.79 4.9943 * 1.81 2.8700  1.44
Steel 9.2257 *** 2.97 13.1728 *** 4.11 14.9811 *** 4.83
Non-ferrous metals 4.1469 1.31 4.8145 ** 2.47 9.1931 *** 3.24
Fabricated metals -0.2983  -0.11 2.2094  1.03 2.3034  0.70
Industrial machinery -0.9233  -0.29 5.5964 ** 1.97 3.8607 * 1.77
Electrical machinery 1.0830  0.36 2.4235  1.41 3.1034 * 1.68
Transportation machinery -0.7582  -0.25 2.3152  0.88 1.6386  0.77
Precision machinery 2.4665 0.83 2.5005  1.33 7.8878 *** 3.64
 
Non-manufacturing industries  
Construction -1.9051  -0.73 1.4357  0.65 1.8025  0.60
Wholesale 0.9141 0.32 3.8230  1.55 3.3738  1.39
Retail 1.6626  0.45 5.2243  1.58 3.9015  1.41
Real estate 15.1203 *** 5.20 20.3585 *** 6.32 19.9063 *** 6.61
Service 3.4292 1.03 8.9656 *** 2.59 3.4453  1.43
Transportation and information
commucication 5.0051 * 1.70 9.3501 *** 2.75 6.6592 ** 2.48
*** ,**,*     significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
　　　　　　　　　　 Table 7  Coefficient Estimates of the Cross Term
   of Firms' Balance Sheet and the Rate of Change in Banks' Share Price 
　　　　　　　　　　                  Small firms firms                      Medium-Sized firms                               Large firms 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Manufacturing industries
Food 0.7295 0.22 -3.1461 -0.91 0.0931 0.03
Textiles 2.7348 1.40 -1.1409 -0.83 2.0984 0.98
Lumber and wood products 2.9718 0.77 -0.9038 -0.24 2.3354 0.58
Paper and pulp 3.9949 * 1.79 0.1192 0.05 3.3585 1.31
Chemicals 1.1729 0.44 -2.7027 -1.01 0.5365 0.18
Petroleum and coal products 0.8445 0.55 -3.0312 *** -3.74 0.2081 0.11
Ceramics, stone and clay product -2.4232 -0.52 -6.2989 -1.36 -3.0596 -0.65
Steel -3.0210 -0.69 -6.8967 -1.62 -3.6574 -0.83
Non-ferrous metals 5.0576 ** 2.20 1.1819 0.52 4.4212 * 1.87
Fabricated metals 1.2102 0.40 -2.6655 -0.83 0.5738 0.17
Industrial machinery 4.0057 1.52 0.1300 0.04 3.3693 1.07
Electrical machinery 1.5704 0.46 -2.3052 -0.70 0.9340 0.26
Transportation machinery -1.4156 -0.30 -5.2912 -1.11 -2.0520 -0.42
Precision machinery -2.5848 -0.83 -6.4605 ** -2.06 -3.2212 -0.98
Non-manufacturing industries
Construction -1.9316 -0.46 -5.8073 -1.40 -2.5680 -0.62
Wholesale 4.2360 1.54 0.3603 0.14 3.5996 1.44
Retail 2.2487 0.42 -1.6269 -0.30 1.6123 0.29
Real estate -4.6148 * -1.88 -8.4905 *** -3.31 -5.2512 * -1.82
Service 0.4582 0.23 -3.4175 ** -2.07 -0.1782 -0.09
Transportation and information
commucication 2.9457 0.64 -0.9300 -0.20 2.3092 0.49
*** ,**,*     significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
Table 8  Estimates of the Effects of Firms' Balance Sheet Conditions
  on Lending Attitude: Use of Banks' Share Price as Banks' Balance Sheet Conditions 
　　　　　　　　　　 Small Medium-Sized Large
firms firms firms 
 Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Manufacturing industries  
Food 0.1114 1.53 0.1067 ** 2.04 0.2253 *** 4.85
Textiles 0.0484 0.74 0.0877 *** 3.63 0.4010 *** 6.12
Lumber and wood products 0.1938 ** 2.33 0.2881 *** 3.23 0.3192 *** 5.95
Paper and pulp 0.1784 *** 2.80 0.2179 *** 3.27 0.1995 *** 6.05
Chemicals 0.1226 *** 2.58 0.1055 *** 3.38 0.2571 *** 5.93
Petroleum and coal products -0.0750 *** -3.24 -0.1432 *** -4.26 0.0984 ** 2.53
Ceramics, stone and clay product 0.0935 0.97 0.1230  1.42 0.2719 *** 4.02
Steel 0.1938 1.58 0.2547 ** 2.04 0.5607 *** 4.43
Non-ferrous metals 0.0974 1.32 0.0919 ** 2.21 0.4101 *** 6.31
Fabricated metals 0.3377 *** 3.16 0.3072 *** 3.46 0.7782 *** 5.57
Industrial machinery 0.2827 *** 3.08 0.3079 *** 3.40 0.4539 *** 5.90
Electrical machinery 0.1843 * 1.94 0.1326 ** 2.45 0.3149 *** 4.93
Transportation machinery 0.1960 1.63 0.2031 ** 1.96 0.3839 *** 4.05
Precision machinery -0.1026 -1.04 -0.0310  -0.53 0.1771 *** 2.63
Non-manufacturing industries
Construction 0.3142 *** 3.02 0.3122 *** 3.48 0.6683 *** 5.82
Wholesale 0.2336 ** 2.09 0.2449 ** 2.53 0.4887 *** 5.24
Retail 0.5690 *** 3.16 0.5601 *** 3.42 0.7330 *** 5.16
Real estate 0.0988 1.23 0.1695 * 1.70 0.5597 *** 4.89
Service -0.1315 -1.36 -0.0795 -0.82 0.1791 *** 2.62
Transportation and information
commucication 0.2647 *** 2.67 0.3772 *** 2.94 0.5325 *** 5.32
*** ,**,*     significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
　　　　　　　　　　      Table 9   Estimates of the Effects of the Rate of Change in Banks' Share Price
on Lending Attitude: Use of Banks' Share Price as Banks' Balance Sheet Conditions 
　　　　　　　　　　  Small  Medium-Sized  Large
 firms  firms  firms 
 Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Manufacturing industries  
Food -0.1346 *** -3.62 -0.1203 *** -4.59 -0.0951 *** -4.37
Textiles -0.2145 *** -3.54 -0.2196 *** -4.64 -0.2222 *** -4.32
Lumber and wood products 0.0556  1.02 0.0286  0.35 0.0076  0.23
Paper and pulp -0.0942 *** -2.84 -0.1320 *** -3.88 -0.0622 *** -3.79
Chemicals -0.0721 *** -2.99 -0.0602 *** -3.31 -0.0763 *** -3.78
Petroleum and coal products -0.0911 *** -4.39 -0.2948 *** -5.47 -0.1537 *** -5.09
Ceramics, stone and clay product -0.0787  -1.64 -0.1035 ** -2.42 -0.0636 * -1.65
Steel -0.0923  -1.42 -0.1391 ** -2.13 -0.1240 * -1.73
Non-ferrous metals -0.1530 *** -3.15 -0.1138 *** -3.74 -0.1857 *** -3.74
Fabricated metals -0.0926 ** -2.09 -0.0972 *** -2.65 -0.1524 *** -2.88
Industrial machinery -0.1680 *** -2.95 -0.1771 *** -3.66 -0.1401 *** -3.63
Electrical machinery -0.1491 *** -2.90 -0.1020 *** -3.55 -0.1128 *** -3.53
Transportation machinery -0.1089 ** -2.22 -0.1282 *** -3.28 -0.1045 *** -2.91
Precision machinery -0.0987 * -1.91 -0.0914 *** -3.07 -0.0852 ** -2.17
 
Non-manufacturing industries  
Construction -0.1045 ** -2.22 -0.1245  0.65 -0.1443 ** -2.53
Wholesale -0.1554 *** -3.25 -0.1662  1.55 -0.1665 *** -4.02
Retail -0.1741 ** -2.34 -0.1946  1.58 -0.1641 *** -2.93
Real estate -0.2381 *** -4.10 -0.3259 *** 6.32 -0.2981 *** -4.77
Service -0.1658 *** -3.14 -0.2292 *** 2.59 -0.1490 *** -4.05
Transportation and information
commucication -0.1471 *** -2.73 -0.2224 *** 2.75 -0.1728 *** -2.93
*** ,**,*     significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
